Deficiencies in the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (PRA) 
I Introduction
Clayton v Clayton signaled a turning point in trust law. 1 The Supreme Court was there unconvinced that the trust in question (the 'VRPT' trust) was illusory. This was the first time the concept of an 'illusory trust' had been before the Supreme Court, but the essence of the argument would have been familiar. An illusory trust is a claim that the court should disregard an apparently valid trust due to the particular combinations of power and control by one party, rendering the trust invalid.
In claims of sham trust, alter ego trust and the bundle of rights doctrine the argument is similar;
that despite the appearance of a valid trust, the particular combination of powers, and structure of the trust, or control exercised by one party means the trust is void. The illusory trust was a new means to a common end. rightful entitlement of the other spouse to equal sharing of relationship property. These claims are not the correct solution. Legislative reform will provide better direction.
These matters will be addressed in the following way. Part II will serve as a background to trust law. It will illustrate briefly the means with which to establish a valid trust. It will then deal with the nature of the sham trust, alter ego trust, illusory trust and bundle of rights doctrine. Part III will explain why these sit uncomfortably within trust law. Part IV will suggest the reason for these causes of action is because the current PRA is flawed. Part V will provide three recommendations for legislative reform. Part VI concludes.
II Background

A Establishing a trust
The trust is integral to the legal landscape of modern New Zealand society. It is estimated that in New Zealand there are between 300,000 and 500,000 trusts. 3 According to the pecuniary interests register of Parliament, 76 ministers of parliament (nearly two-thirds of all ministers of parliament)
hold a beneficial interest in a trust or serve as a trustee. 4 This prevalence is reflective of the traditional view in society that: "Every successful man should have a trust".
5
The trust is a historic institution (derived from 'the use') and powerful legal mechanism. 6 It is an "institute of great elasticity and generality". 7 A person may settle a trust for various reasons ranging from, settling land and assets for future generations of a family, to reducing tax, or avoiding creditors. Lectures (1936 , Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1936 was held on trust including the family home. The decision was that the trust was the defendant's alter ego. 29 The defendant husband was the principal beneficiary and financer of the trust; borrowing money to enable the trustees to buy properties, and servicing the loans, rates and the insurance on the properties. 30 The family home was treated as though it was owned by the defendant. 31 Therefore the assets could be treated as the husband's property, and the finding of an alter ego trust justified the imposition of a constructive trust allowing for access to the relationship property.
32
An alter ego trust alone is now insufficient to justify invalidating a trust. According to Robertson and O'Regan LJ: "The assumption of factual control by someone other than a trustee…or by someone without legal right to exercise such power cannot of itself invalidate a trust". 33 An alter ego argument must be based on a provision of the trust deed such as a power to appoint and remove beneficiaries that could be exercised so as to give the holder total right to trust property.
34
Otherwise the alter ego evidence must meet the high threshold required for a sham.
35
This is because according to New Zealand property law a party cannot acquire complete ownership by factual control alone. 36 A stranger who takes control of trust assets will be considered a trustee de son tort and be liable to account for the property to the beneficiaries. 37 While claims that control should equate to ownership are unsuccessful their presence is indicative of concern about the extent of control some parties are able to exercise over trust assets, while also eliminating valid third party claims to relationship property. 35 Peart, above n 10, at 67. 36 Palmer, above n 20, at 474. 37 Palmer, above n 14, at 89. 38 Palmer, above n 20, at 474. New Zealand's approach to alter ego trusts is in line with the United Kingdom. 39 In the case of Prest v Petrodel it was argued the power of control by the husband over assets owned by companies, equated with property and as such order could be made over those assets. The United Kingdom Supreme Court rejected this and said such claims would cut across statutory schemes of company and insolvency law. It would be unfair to creditors whose claims would then sit below the wife.
40
Bundle of Rights
The bundle of rights doctrine is a concept developed by the courts. 41 It categorises powers of control, and a discretionary beneficiary's interest, as part of a bundle of rights capable of being considered property of value under the PRA.
42
In the case of Walker v Walker the trustee was a company of which the husband was the only director. The husband and wife were settlors and discretionary beneficiaries and had transferred relationship property to the trust. They had powers to appoint and remove directors and to appoint themselves trustee. Upon seperation the husband wanted to buy the wife's interest in the debt owed to her by the trust. The issue was as to the value of this debt. The court found that the debt:
43 "Had to be understood as part of a bundle of rights that included the following "items of property"…The court described these assets together with the debt as forming a "very valuable package" because they conferred control over the business, the major subject of the trust.
Like alter ego the bundle of rights doctrine may not be a successful argument alone. 44 The case of Financial Markets Authority v Hotchin did not support the bundle of rights doctrine. 45 In that case the power of appointment of trustees and beneficiaries over several trusts did not equate to beneficial ownership of the assets. 46 This has been termed the "death knell" for the bundle of rights argument.
47
However the bundle of rights doctrine proved successful in Clayton v Clayton. There, the particular powers held by Mr Clayton over the trust were deemed 'property' for the purpose of the PRA.
4 Illusory
For a trust to be illusory there must be:
49
Genuine intention to create a trust but in light of the provisions of the trust deed it is apparent the settlor retains such control that the proper construction is that he did not intend to…part with control over the property sufficient to construct a trust.
An illusory trust is therefore distinct from a sham trust (where there is no genuine intention to create a trust). If a trust is illusory the property is considered to be owned by whoever owned it prior to the creation of the trust. 50 In the case of Harrison v Harrison the husband and wife were settlors and beneficiaries. 51 Under the trust deed they had significant power to appoint and remove trustees. The sole trustee was a company which the settlors effectively controlled as major use and enjoyment of all the assets transferred to the trustee; until at some later date when they might decide to transfer some or all of the assets…Given the ability and the apparent intention, there is a serious argument…that...the legal and equitable estates unite in the husband and wife.
The illusory trust claim has been dismissed by the New Zealand Supreme Court in Clayton v Clayton. 53 This was a relationship property dispute that was eventually settled out of court. Mr
Clayton acquired many assets during the relationship and settled four large trusts. One of these was subject to a claim that it was a sham or illusory. The Supreme Court's preferred approach was that a trust is either valid or it is not: "For our part we do not see any value in using the 'illusory label': if there is no valid trust that is all that needs to be said".
54
III Issues with these claims
The sham trust, alter ego trust, illusory trust and bundle of rights doctrine are not the correct means by which to invalidate a trust.
A Sham
The The phrase "sham trust" is a misnomer. Sham and trust are mutually exclusive concepts…sham is no more than a descriptive label attaching to a transaction, which appears to be something that it is not. Therefore, on any given set of facts, there is either a trust or no trust and there is no such thing as a sham trust.
B Alter Ego
Like the sham trust the alter ego trust has origins in commerce. It applied in relation to companies said to be under the control of an individual or other company. It can hold an individual personally liable for actions theoretically attributable to that company, or prevent the company denying liability incurred as a result of the controlling individual's actions. 61 Like the sham trust the alter ego trust is now being used in a context distinct from that where it originated.
It is now clear that effective control will not equate to ownership. heads of sham trust, alter ego trust, illusory trust and the bundle of rights doctrine are highlighting this level of control as an issue. However these claims cannot provide the solution because they are ill-suited to trust law.
C Bundle of Rights
The Law Commission was not persuaded that the bundle of rights concept was the best way forward because of the difficulties posed by legal principle as to whether purely discretionary interests can ever be classified as proprietary interests. 63 The claim that powers of appointment under a trust should be considered property bears much resemblance to the claim that effective control renders the trust an alter ego and therefore the property of the owner. This is contradictory as the alter ego claim is deemed to contravene property law, while the bundle of rights claim found 
D Illusory
The illusory trust is still controversial and there is some debate as to whether it is distinct from the sham trust. It is of small significance in the legal field:
64
If the notion of illusory trusts was well known in the law and able to invalidate large numbers of trusts you'd expect to find it wrapped in lights in all the leading text books on trusts -but it isn't. For example it isn't referred to in the current editions of: Lewin on The…decision is to be commended for correcting the development of an 'off-shoot' in trust law, which could have undermined established trust law principles and resulted in uncertainty for settlors and beneficiaries beyond the relationship property context.
The argument is one the court has heard before and been clear to clarify; that effective control is insufficient to invalidate a trust. This is clear by the high standard for a sham trust, the ineffectiveness of the alter ego trust and (until Clayton v Clayton) the bundle of rights doctrine.
The appearance of the illusory trust in 2016 shows that where one cause of action is dispelled by the court, the same concerns about trust practice will appear under a different guise. It remains a lottery as to which claim will find success, and the recurring issue should be dealt with instead.
E Example: Vervoort v Forrest
Despite the difficulty to prove a claim under these heads they are by no means extinct. In 2016 an unsuccessful sham claim was heard in the case of Vervoort v Forrest. 66 In that case the appellant and respondent were in a relationship for 12 years. The respondent settled a family trust well in advance of the relationship. The trust had shares in various companies and also purchased a lifestyle block with the intention of this being the family home of the couple. It was argued that the trust was a sham. The husband was the settlor with power to appoint new trustees and beneficiaries. But he did not have the power to appoint himself sole trustee or to change existing beneficiaries.
67
The court followed the Clayton v Clayton approach that "there is either a valid trust or there is 65 Jeremy Bell Connell "Clayton v Clayton: Nipping the illusory trust in the bud" (2015) This entitlement is promised under the PRA but can be defeated by dispositions to a trust. The defendant enjoys the guise of a trust and thus prevents access to property for relationship property division. In the meantime the defendant often maintains de facto control over the assets that without a trust the disadvantaged spouse or partner would be entitled to half of.
F Summary
The continued prevalence of such claims regardless of their success is concerning. This is because sham trust, alter ego trust, the bundle of rights doctrine and illusory trust claims are ill-suited for trust law, their use is conceptually flawed and is creating an uncertain system.
Allowing a trust that appears valid according to the three certainties to be deemed invalid at a later date due to a sham trust, illusory trust, alter ego trust or the bundle of rights doctrine is bad law.
Firstly it is uncertain and may detrimentally affect beneficiaries' entitlements. It leads to concern about the stability of a trust. Secondly having sham trust, alter ego trust and illusory trust arguments as seperate causes of action is conceptually confusing. The claims are based on the true intent of the settlor and should not be considerations in themselves but should go towards 68 At [37] . 69 At [85] .
certainty of intention. The task of the court should be: "Simply to ascertain the genuine intention of the party or parties". 
IV Reasons For The Claims
It has been said the biggest and most vocal dissatisfaction with the settling of a trust is from an affected partner or spouse following seperation. 71 The PRA is inadequately dealing with such settlements of trust property. This is the reason for sham trusts, alter ego trusts, illusory trusts and the bundle of rights doctrine.
A Issues with PRA
Sweeping reforms were made to the Matrimonial Property Act 1976 resulting in the PRA. The Act provides for how the property of married couples, civil union couples and couples who have lived in a de facto relationship is to be divided when they seperate. 72 All other enactments are to be read subject to the act. 73 The reforms resulted in a conceptual shift from a system of deferred participation to a system of deferred community of property. 74 All relationship property was from that point onwards to be equally shared unless, extraordinary circumstances make this unjust or the relationship is of a short duration. 75 The distinction between domestic and non-domestic property was removed and 'relationship property' given a wide definition for the purposes of division. 76 A party to a relationship has a right to an interest in the family home and, is given a right to seperate property that may have turned into relationship property. 77 This Act was a clear commitment to an assertive and far reaching equal sharing regime and one that must be honoured.
Claims being brought to court have allowed judges to identify that the equal sharing promise heralded with the introduction of the PRA is not being upheld. The problem is the lack of access to trust assets during relationship property proceedings. 78 The claims brought are not the correct mechanism with which the judges should provide justice. But because the legislation does not allow access to trust property where necessary, claims under the heads discussed have been brought where the result would otherwise not give effect to the equal sharing regime of the PRA:
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A number of commentators believe that the problem is not with trust law which is based on a core set of settled principles that can be used for particular purposes but rather with the ineffectiveness of the anti-avoidance rules protecting creditors, spouses and partners.
Rather than changing the settled trust principles…the PRA should be amended to ensure that both parties to the relationship share more equitably in all of the assets created from that relationship whether or not they are held personally or by trust.
Where assets cannot be reached under the PRA the courts are showing:
80
Increased willingness to consider alternative avenues to reach an outcome that broadly reflects the entitlement that the parties would have received if the assets had been subject to the Act. 
C Issues with s 44C
If intention cannot be proven (as is often the case) s 44C allows the court to set aside a transfer of relationship property to a trust even if there was no intention to defeat rights but the transfer had that effect. 90 The court can make orders requiring one spouse to pay the other a sum of money from seperate property, or for the sum of money to be paid from the income of the trust. 91 to access trust capital. This is because the enactment of the PRA signaled a promise to couples that there would be equal sharing of relationship property. This was irrespective of all things.
100
Because trust capital cannot be accessed under the legislation sham trust, alter ego trusts, illusory trusts and bundle of rights arguments have arisen: 101 Where the property has been placed beyond the reaches of ss 44 and 44C, applicants have employed arguments of sham trusts, alter ego trusts, illusory trusts and the bundle of rights.
In some cases the partner could make an alternative application under s 182 of the Family Proceedings Act 1980 (FPA). 102 In other cases the claimant will be left with no alternative means by which to assert their promised right to an equal share of relationship property.
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D Issues with s 182 Family Proceedings Act
Section 182 of the FPA gives the court the power to remove capital from the trust. However this power is restricted. 104 Section 182 applies to marriages and civil unions not to de facto relationships. Application can only be made within a reasonable time after the marriage or civil union is dissolved and s 182 cannot be used when the order dissolving the marriage was made in a foreign court. 105 The section is useful when the parties have been married and their relationship property has been transferred into trust and there is little relationship property to which s 44C can apply. Section 182 allows access to trust capital, potentially resettling that capital onto a new trust so that the expectation can be fulfilled. 106 The section is not useful when the trust is ante-nuptial and the spouse is one of a large number of beneficiaries. 107 Most importantly the section excludes de facto couples.
The policy of s 182 distribution does not start from an equal sharing basis. This therefore contravenes the policy of the PRA, despite other enactments needing to be read subject to the PRA. 108 Exclusion of de facto couples means that married and civil union couples have more access to compensation than unmarried couples. This is unjust and is in conflict with the policy of the PRA.
109
E Examples 1 Ward v Ward
The policy of the legislative landscape is equal sharing. This purpose is being frustrated and some claimants left without compensation. In the case of Ward v Ward the court declined to make an order under s 44C. The couple were married for 14 years, during which the husband inherited a farming business. Under legal advice the couple vested half the shares in the wife with an agreement under s 21 of the PRA. 110 They both transferred the shares into trust and began forgiving the debts owed by trustees. Upon seperation they were each owed the same amount but in that time the farm had increased significantly in value. Upon seperation the wife was left with her entitlement to a share of outstanding debt from the disposition of the farming shares to the trust.
This was drastically less than her relationship property entitlement would have been if they had retained ownership of the shares. The husband derived great benefit from the trust and the wife derived none. Because she was party to the plan the wife could not claim under s 44 that the disposition was intended to defeat her rights. The balance of the debt owed outside of the trust was not sufficient to cover the wife's entitlement. Section 182 provided compensation and 50% of the trust was ordered to be resettled on a seperate trust. 111 Had the claimants not been married s 182
would not have applied and Mrs Ward would have been left without redress.
In the case of Kidd v Van den Brink a trust was settled by the father-in-law before the wife met and married his son. 112 It held all of the couple's assets and she had contributed to the assets in various ways. Upon seperation the trust lacked the nuptial character required by s 182 as settlements must be in relation to a particular marriage. 113 The parties later settled and the appeal was abandoned. 114 It was only because of the out of court settlement that the wife's claim received recognition. The court could not have assisted her with an order from the PRA or s 182.
O v S
In the case of O v S the parties were in a de facto relationship for 10 years. 115 The trust was found to be an alter ego and this justified a successful constructive trust claim of $75,000. Despite this the judge gave priority to the PRA. 116 There was intention to defeat rights under s 44 but because the second respondents received the property in good faith the claim was defeated. Order was made under s 44C to compensate. The husband had no seperate property from which order could be made and there was no income from the trust. The judge decided the husband would have the ability to raise the funds based on past business evidence. Therefore, despite there being $75,000
in the trust to which the wife was entitled and that would provide swift redress the wife had to wait for the funds to be raised by the husband. This contravenes the principle of the PRA.
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F Summary
The current regime must be altered. The trust while popular is at a time of revolution. The Law
Commission has critiqued the Trustee Act and proposed reform. 118 We are entering a 'trust-busting' era and as such the trust may face further attacks. 119 This article is in favour of upholding the integrity of the trust as well as the integrity of New Zealand's relationship property legislation.
In order to do this access to trust capital must be legislated for. Trust law is no longer clear and coherent. It has become confused by claims of sham trust, alter ego trust, illusory trust and the bundle of rights doctrine. This is because the purpose of the PRA is being frustrated and undermined. The law no longer fulfils its policy goals.
V Solution: Reform PRA
The recommendations of this article will uphold the purpose of the PRA and its equal sharing regime as well as serve to clarify the law of trusts. Some may argue access to trust capital to allow equal division is unfair but the present policy is one of equal sharing and this article argues from the basis that this policy should be upheld.
A Recommendation 1
Section 44C should be reformed so trust capital can be accessed by court order where there is insufficient income from the trust, or no seperate property to award payment from. This would extend the current powers of the court in order to compensate a partner whose rights were defeated by disposition of relationship property to a trust. The power to order compensation would be available only when it was not possible to otherwise compensate the defeated partner. or part of the capital of the trust until a specified amount has been paid.
B Recommendation 2
Section 182 of the FPA should be repealed. The Law Commission suggests reform of this provision to include de facto couples. 121 Reform is not sufficient. Section 182 is ancient and:
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It was enacted at a time when the law didn't recognise the legitimacy of people cohabitating. To do so was to live in sin and the law would not validate immoral arrangements.
The PRA was enacted to provide a comprehensive property relationship system. It takes precedent over conflicting legislation and has an equal sharing policy. Section 182 does not begin from this position of equal sharing and therefore its policy is in conflict with the PRA. It should be repealed to resolve this conflict. 123 Provision for division of relationship property for clarity and fairness should be made in one piece of legislation. The reformed s 44C would have the same 'trust busting' effect as s 182 once did.
C Recommendation 3
The reform that is currently suggested in discourse does not sufficiently address the issues that are presenting in trust law. It is clear that some settlors are taking advantage of the system and also maintaining effective control of trust property. This control does not justify intervention on the basis that the property be deemed to be owned by the controlling party. However it should justify intervention in some way. The effective control of trusts by a party is the common theme in claims under sham trust, alter ego trust, illusory trust and the bundle of rights doctrine. Rather than merely allowing access to trust capital when this occurs there should be explicit legislation stating that this type of control is not condoned. Other indications of intent could include a time limit. If a disposition to trust is made within two years before termination of a relationship then it will be presumed to have been intended to defeat rights. There is a strong emphasis in the PRA that the family home should always be available for division. 124 Therefore if the family home is placed on trust and out of reach of one spouse or partner it will be deemed to have been intended to defeat rights. An exception to this could be if both parties have the same rights under the trust (both trustees, beneficiaries etc.) therefore allowing these dispositions to take place if they occur legitimately.
The Law Commission did not propose any legislative action in regard to sham trust, alter ego trust, illusory trust and the bundle of rights doctrine, as reform to s 44C was assumed to be sufficient. But it is not. This article directly addresses the pressing issue, that the trusts in New Zealand are increasingly being controlled to the extent that the trust structure is being exploited, and the policy of the PRA is undermined. Accessing trust capital is not enough to make New Zealand trust law and relationship property law reliable once more. An explicit legislative provision is needed to give clear parliamentary direction.
124 Sections 1C, 8, 11A, 11B.
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Key:
• This is inserted text 44 Dispositions may be set aside 
D Implications 1 Trust Law
As the system stands the sanctity of trust is at greater risk of being undermined without a 'trust busting' provision than with one. Without this the trust will continue to come under attack from conceptually uncertain doctrines such as sham trust, alter ego trust, the bundle of rights doctrine and illusory trust. It is better for legislation not ad hoc causes of action to determine when a trust can be accessed. To look through a trust there must be valid reason to do so. Legislation gives clear direction to courts as to when this should occur. This may disrupt beneficiary interests but if it is fair to make an order it should be done. 125 Parties could still contract out of this regime under s 21 of the Act.
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This article has proven the PRA is being circumvented and the legislation is deficient. By reforming the PRA claimants will have the opportunity to access trusts if it is just for this to occur.
It will prevent claims based on ill-suited and conceptually uncertain doctrines. It will streamline the legal system and provide clear legislative direct as to when it is justified to look through a trust.
This strengthens the sanctity of trust rather than undermining it.
PRA
This will re-invigorate the equal sharing regime of the PRA. The PRA will no longer be circumvented by placing property on trust yet maintaining effective control. The reform to s 44 will mean that the section extends its utility. Married, civil union and de facto couples will be equally entitled to benefit from a 'trust busting' provision and the policy of the PRA will be strengthened and no longer confused by conflicting legislation. This upholds the principles of the act. 127 The proposed amendments will serve as a symbol of re-commitment to the equal sharing regime of the PRA. This is an integral element to New Zealand's legislative landscape and its workability must be closely monitored.
Alignment with other jurisdictions
Allowing access to trust capital and recognising effective control as a basis for court intervention will align New Zealand with the discretionary regimes of Australia and the United Kingdom.
128
Some alignment with the United Kingdom is already apparent in this area of law, with the similar approaches of New Zealand and the United Kingdom in regards to the alter ego doctrine.
129
However these countries recognise assets in a trust as part of a person's wealth available in relationship property disputes. In Australia the court can take into account the financial resources of either partner when making an order. This has been interpreted to include property over which the spouse has de facto control. 130 Rather than mimicking these countries and deeming effective control of property to mean it is owned by the controlling party, the proposed approach does not contravene property law while still gaining the benefits that the approach has had in these jurisdictions.
Alignment with existing legislation
This proposal will align the provisions in the PRA with the approach of other New Zealand property if there is effective control, and there should be a streamlined approach across all areas of law.
132
VI Conclusion
The Law Commission is at work on a review of relationship property law and must find a middle ground between the sanctity of trust and the policy of equal sharing of relationship property in the relationship property legislation. The recommendations of this article traverse this and arrive at a suitable compromise. It is time for a true 'trust busting' provision. Claimants are within their rights to attempt to access the equal share they are entitled to under the PRA but trust law should not weather these claims. Legislation is an appropriate means of directing these claims and giving effect to the law as it stands.
The amendments proposed by this article would clarify trust law, strengthen the PRA and provide certainty to both. It would uphold the credibility and authenticity of the trust as a legal instrument, while also recognising the valid rights of spouses or partners on dissolution of a relationship. The balancing act is complicated but the time has come for a Property (Relationships) Act that fulfils its promise. 
